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damage to civil liberties than to the nation’s physical well-being. “Once alienated, an ‘unalienable right’ is apt to be
forever lost.” He documents this assertion with a list of police killings of innocent people in their homes and of
indefensible searches and seizures.
While a reasonable reader may dismiss
these discomforting examples as well
researched exceptions to normal law
enforcement activity in the United
States, Vidal also brings up the changing nature of the law. He refers to U.S.
v. Sandini (1987), which established
that police were able to seize property
permanently from an individual if the
property has been used for criminal
purposes, even if the individual has had
no involvement with any crime. This
ruling has highly negative implications,
considering that 90 percent of American paper currency has traces of narcotics on it from use in the drug trade.
Vidal also points out a common problem that is not commonly pondered—
the incidence of homosexual rape in the
U.S. prison system, a violation of the
cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause
of the Bill of Rights. For anyone who
doubts that such punishment is state
sanctioned, Vidal quotes a state attorney general who refers to this practice
in a public statement made in the
course of his official duties. He is reminiscent of the military author Colonel
Charles Dunlap, U.S. Army, in his references to blatant disrespect to President Bill Clinton on a naval vessel by
seamen, who called Clinton “the Praetorian Guard of the Pentagon,” and our
“ruling junta.”
There is one other weakness: the book
fails to address properly the meat of the
issue that its title promises—“how we
got to be so hated.” The Federation of
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American Scientists has published a
twenty-page listing of American military operations dating from 1948 to
1999, documenting how the United
States (like the nations of Orwell’s
1984) has an “enemy of the month
club” and thus engages in a “perpetual
war” hoping for “perpetual peace.” This
theme is underdeveloped, however, and
Vidal’s discussion of the United States
emphasizes domestic repression, while
his reprinted chapters focus too exclusively on an apology (in the Platonic
sense of an explanation) of Timothy
McVeigh.
Altogether, Perpetual War for Perpetual
Peace presents a provocative argument
that will be of intellectual appeal to
professional military officers. It is admittedly an alternative perspective, but
it may give members of the American
national security community insight
into how our European allies think, as
well as our Third World adversaries,
who often share Vidal’s perspective.
Vidal’s arguments are intriguing, but
the brevity of the new parts of this
work ultimately leaves his thoughts
incomplete.
MICHAEL MORGAN

Captain, U.S. Army

Jalali, Ali Ahmad, and Lester W. Grau, eds. The
Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in
the Soviet-Afghan War. Quantico, Va.: U.S. Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division. 416pp.
(no price given)

What could be both more poignant and
ludicrous than Commander Abdul Baqi
Balots’s account of his survival of a
firefight in which his closest friend was
killed? “I saw a lot of Soviets coming at
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me and they were all firing (they put
ten bullet holes through my baggy trousers). . . . Habib Noor told me that, unless we crossed the stream to the north,
we would not be able to engage the Soviets. . . . I ran across and jumped but
landed directly into the stream. ‘Oh, Allah,’ I cried, ‘you have killed me without dignity.’ Then I made a big jump, I
don’t know how since even a tank can’t
clear it, but I did and got out of the
stream.”
This episode is recounted in Ali Jalali
and Lester Grau’s book The Other Side
of the Mountain. The two editors are
well known for a sequence of publications on unconventional warfare going
back to the early 1990s. For those who
follow this field, it is no surprise that
they are employed at the U.S. Army’s
distinguished Foreign Military Studies
Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Their highly readable compilation is a
significant contribution to the literature
on guerrilla warfare, and it has immense implications for the contemporary (at this writing) U.S. intervention
in Afghanistan.
The work consists of ninety-two “vignettes” of tactical action, with a few
longer accounts of more protracted operations, all based on interviews with
mujahideen participants. The book was
inspired by a Russian text used at the
Frunze Combined Arms Academy, detailing Soviet tactical action in Afghanistan. Jalali and Grau earlier produced
an English translation of that book under the title The Bear Went Over the
Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (National Defense Univ.
Press, 1996). The Other Side of the
Mountain points out when one of its
short stories covers the same actions or
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operations as in Bear, but the works are
not parallel texts.
The present work consists of fourteen
chapters and a conclusion, composed of
two to sixteen stories apiece. Each
chapter illustrates a different type of
tactical combat. There is a short discussion of the tactic before each chapter
and a commentary at the end. This format has been used in military writing for
many years (such as in the study Infantry
in Battle, edited by George Marshall,
Military History and Publications section of The Infantry School, 1934).
However, in recent decades the implicit
analysis this approach provides has
been greatly strengthened by the more
explicit case-study method. If these stories had been written and presented as
formal case studies, some existing
weaknesses could have been avoided—
the chief one being burying the chapter
“Blocking Enemy Lines of Communication” halfway through the book, despite
the editors’ and contributors’ amply
demonstrated contention that logistics
dominated the Soviet war in Afghanistan and was its chief strategic (not tactical) factor.
The thematic organization of the chapters is a powerful approach, but it
means sacrificing any sense of chronological development. As a result, there
is little sense of the evolution of
mujahideen tactics during the war or of
their interaction over time with Soviet
tactics, despite occasional references
to such evolution in the chapter commentaries. In fact, the work places
unreasonable expectations on the background knowledge of the reader. A
summary of the war’s origins, conduct,
and outcome is badly needed. A table
listing each major mujahideen faction,
with its leader, ideology, and sponsors,
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would also be helpful, as these factions
are referred to throughout the narrative.
The book might also have addressed
popular myths or conceptions about
the war—for example, the U.S. view
that distribution of Stinger antiaircraft
missiles to the mujahideen broke the
back of Soviet air support and hence
was the decisive point of the struggle.
The editors at a number of points indicate their disagreement with this view
but never provide a formal rebuttal.
On the other hand, the book capriciously provides detailed background
information on such relatively trivial
points as the official U.S. Army load
weights for mules, Central Asian horses,
and camels.
The book has a strong geographic
bias—most of the actions it describes
are in the vicinity of Kabul or on the
route connecting Kabul and Jalalabad.
Most of the remaining actions are in
the Kandahar area. There is nothing
from the Herat region, or the area
around Maz~r-e Shar§f, or the Panjshir
Valley. This bias may be explained by a
point the editors make in their introduction, that a number of interviews
could not be completed because of the
1996 Taliban advance on Kabul and the
north. Still, they need to explain how
they have compensated for this imbalance in their material, especially in view
of their own contention that the conduct of the war varied by region and by
the ethnicities involved.
There may be an issue in this book with
language as well. Good interpreters are
well aware of the temptation to tidy up
the haphazard use of specialized terminology by speakers of a foreign language, by rendering it in precise,
professional English usage. The editors
remark in the introduction that
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although their contributors always referred to “Russians,” they have changed
this throughout to “Soviets.” Did the
same process occur in transcribing the
interviewees’ descriptions of guerrilla
operations? In this book even the most
irregular of mujahideen commanders
seems to have a perfect grasp of U.S.
military terms and phrasing, implying
an equal grasp of the concepts behind
the words.
Unfortunately, the book’s proofing and
editing is distractingly bad, which is a serious handicap in a work containing so
many foreign words and names. An end
sheet includes production credits for the
book—it seems only appropriate that
one is listed for “Book Editing and
Desing.” A particularly unfortunate result of this hasty editing is found in the
commentary following a chapter on urban combat. On first reading, this evaluation of a mujahideen bombing of a city
market appears actually to be a defense
of terrorist attacks on civilian noncombatants. Closer attention, however,
shows that the editors were attempting
to contrast this particular incident with
the Soviet aerial bombardment campaign aimed at driving the population
from the Afghan countryside, but the
text certainly reads as though it is equating any air strike with terrorism.
These flaws detract from but do not
negate the high value of this book. In
addition to its major strength of firsthand accounts of the most significant
guerrilla war of our time, the book has
many other useful features. Its use of
maps is particularly adept, and consistent references to Defense Mapping
Agency map sheets give a sense of detail
and nuance to the work. While it is exceptionally riddled with typographical
errors, the glossary covers nearly all the
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specialized and foreign terms used in the
book, at exactly the right level of detail.
In sum, The Other Side of the Mountain
is a unique and valuable contribution to
the study of unconventional warfare. In
view of the ongoing U.S. operations in
Afghanistan, the editors would be performing a civic service were they to
produce a revised and reedited version
for general publication.
WILLIAM C. GREEN

Department of Political Science
CSU San Bernardino

Ellsberg, Daniel. Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam
and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking Penguin, 2002. 498pp. $29.95

For Americans who were adults during
the Vietnam War, the name Daniel
Ellsberg is portentous; it either suggests
a whiff of treason or connotes heroic
patriotism. Ellsberg is a Marine Corps
veteran, Harvard Ph.D., former senior
official in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, a highly regarded analyst for
the RAND Corporation, and a civilian
observer of platoon-level combat in
Vietnam who defiantly chose to “walk
point” with the troops he was observing. In March 1971, Ellsberg released to
the New York Times a seven-thousandpage, highly classified Department of
Defense history of American involvement in Vietnam. Covering the war
from the Truman administration
through the Tet offensive of early 1968,
this study became known as “The Pentagon Papers” when the New York
Times began publishing it on 13 June.
Ellsberg’s action earned him federal felony indictments and a protracted criminal trial. On 11 May 1973 the judge
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abruptly dismissed the government’s
case, because in the last few weeks evidence had materialized showing that
agents of the Richard M. Nixon administration had denied Ellsberg his right
to a fair trial by burglarizing his psychiatrist’s office in search of material with
which to blackmail him into not releasing more documents. This revelation
became part of the unfolding drama of
the Watergate scandal, the surreptitious
forced nighttime entry into the Democratic Party headquarters by the same
agents of the administration. President
Nixon attempted to buy the silence of
one of the burglars, E. Howard Hunt,
with a seventy-five-thousand-dollar
bribe. Facing impeachment for attempting to cover up the break-in,
Nixon wailed about Ellsberg: “The
sonofabitching thief is made a national
hero. . . . And the New York Times gets a
Pulitzer for stealing documents.”
Secrets is a book that must be read by
anyone seeking to understand how the
United States formulates its strategy
and policy. Ellsberg demolishes the
“quagmire” thesis favored by such influential liberal interpreters as Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr. By that interpretation,
beginning with Harry S. Truman up to
the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson,
each president made a deeper commitment of American military power and
clandestine activity, under the conviction that his actions would achieve a
South Vietnamese victory over the invaders from the communist North.
From Ellsberg’s perspective, there was
no quagmire, only endless presidential
deception of Congress and the public,
who were led to believe decade after decade that surely the next step would result in the successful establishment of a
permanently independent South
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